P.J. Healy
Event Information
- Presentations: October 15 and 16, 2008
Presenter Information
Schedule
1. Wed. Oct. 15, 3.30-5.30, McClelland 401KK: Behavioral Mechanism Design, Part 1.
Refreshments served in the middle.
2. Thu. Oct. 16, 3.30-5.30, McC 401KK: Behavioral Mechanism Design, Part 2.
Refreshments served in the middle.
Reading Lists
View Reading List in PDF format or scroll down to access specific papers:
1. Surveys of Mechanism Design & Implementation Theory
(a) Hurwicz, L., 1973. The design of mechanisms for resource allocation. American Economic Review 63, 1–30.
(b) Moore, J., 1995. Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information. In: Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. Vol.1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Ch. 5.
(c) Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., Green, J. R., 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, New York. Chapter 23.
(d) Jackson, M. O., 2001. A crash course in implementation theory. Social Choice and Welfare 18, 655–708.
(e) Jackson, M. O., 2003. Mechanism theory. In: Derigs, U. (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems. EOLSS Publishers, Oxford.
2. Application I: Lindahl & Walrasian Equilibrium
(a) Groves, T., Ledyard, J. O., 1977. Optimal allocation of public goods: A solution to the ‘free-rider’ problem. Econometrica 45, 783–809.
(b) Hurwicz, L., 1979. Outcome functions yielding Walrasian and Lindahl allocations at Nash equilibrium points. Review of Economic Studies 46, 217–225.
(c) Hurwicz, L., 1979. On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory 21, 140–165.
(d) Walker, M., 1981. A simple incentive compatible scheme for attaining Lindahl allocations. Econometrica 49, 65–71.
(e) Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., 1990. Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities. Econometrica 58, 1255–1277.
(f) Monderer, D., Shapley, L. S., 1996. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior 14, 124–143.
(g) * Chen, Y., 2004. Incentive compatible mechanisms for pure public goods: A survey of experimental research. (Download the figures) In: Plott, C. R., Smith, V. (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics Results. Elsevier Press, Amsterdam.
(h) * Healy, P. J., 2006. Learning dynamics for mechanism design: An experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory 129 (1), 114–149.
3. Application II: Optimal Contracting & Regulation
(a) * Healy, P. J., Ledyard, J. O., Noussair, C., Thronson, H., Ulrich, P., Varsi, J., June 2007. Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study Experimental Economics 10 (2), 143–167.
4. Application III: Prediction Markets
(a) Wolfers, J., Zitzewitz, E., 2004. Prediction markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (2), 107–126.
(b) Manski, C. F., 2006. Interpreting the predictions of predictions markets. Economics Letters 91, 425–429.
(c) Wolfers, J., Zitzewitz, E., December 2006. Interpreting prediction market prices as probabilities, NBER Working Paper No. 12200.
(d) * Healy, P. J., Ledyard, J. O., Linardi, S., Lowery, J. R., 2008. Prediction market alternatives for complex environments, Ohio State University working paper.
5. Application IV: Matching & School Choice
(a) McKinney, N., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., 2005. The collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse and why such failures are rare. American Economic Review 95 (3), 878–889.
(b) * Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., 2008. Making markets thick: Designing rules for offers and acceptances, Stanford University working paper.
For more information, view upcoming Department of Economics seminars, or please contact us.
